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The translation of "Saiban". The word "saibont", as a technical 
term in Japanese jurisprudence, has the sense of judgme7et rather 
than of actio?~. But in this treatise~ the ~unction of the e'lawsuit", in 
which the substantive law is applied to a concrete case and the 
state's volition to attempt to settle the disputes represented by the 
case is expressed at the same time; and the internal structure 'of the 
"lawsuit'; to re.aiize such a function, are dealt with. And the con-
crete formulation of the substantive law in the "lawsuit" and the 
establishment of the state volition, which I have mentioned above, 
come to be merged in the judgment and expressed to the outside. 
After all, these are m-olded gradually through the whole process of 
the "lawsuit" and form the ((judgment". Therefore, including this 
process also, we have here translated "saiban" into act,ion, using it 
not in the sense of an act of a party but of a judical prosecution 
of proceedings throughout their course to the judgment in which is 
expressed their ~esult. 
2 The Marxian Theory and the Study G,f the Law of Procedure 
I. The Marxian Theory in the Field of Jurisprudence 
Contemporary jurisprudence, following the tradition of Roman 
law, has not yet come fully into academic contact with Marxian 
jurisprudence. So far as concerns the study of private law, its 
main current is interpretative jurisprudence centering around 
arguments on the legal constrL~,ction of provisions of law. The 
sociology of law and social jurisprudence are still in a subordinate 
position, in spite of endeavors on the part of scholars devoted to 
them. The existing state of things is that Marxian jurisprudence 
has had hardly any influence on in~erpretative jurisprudence. This 
has been more especially the case with the study of the law of 
procedure based on institutional technique. 
The relation between Marxian jurisprudence and interpreta-
tive jurisprudence which follows the tradition of Roman law is 
comparable to that between Marxian economics and modern theoret-
ical economics centering about the general theory of equilibrium. 
In Marxian economics, the analysis of the structure of capitalistic 
society fcrms the center of its theory, and its academic concern 
is chiefly to clarify the laws of development peculiar to capitalistic 
society (Lange)2). And Marxian jurisprudence, maintaining that 
the basis of modern civic society is capitalistic society, understands 
a]1 Iegal phenomena in the laws of civi*~ society a,s an aspect of 
the process of the circulation of commodities. Thus Paschukanis 
follows the development of the modern legal theory pari passu with 
the development of capitalistic society, and insists on the trans-
formation of the legal subject (persons) into the abstract in 
modern capitalistic society; the materialization of their reciprocal 
relations, and, contrariwise, the personification of things (com-
2) Lange, O., Marxia7~ Economics a'ud Moderlt Ecowomic Theory 
(Re~,iews of Ecowomic Studies, Vol._II, pp. 189-201). 
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modities)3). In Japan, the late Professor Kako explained the 
specific character of modern law from the same viewpoint4), and 
then Professors Yamanaka and Kawashima (though from slightly 
different standpoints) developed this theory and published their 
detailed arguments in the field of the law of rights ilb rem and the 
law of rights il~ persolbam, thus taking a step forward in the cor-
relation of that theory with interpretative jurisprudence5). 
But the arguments of Paschukanis and the late Professor 
Kako are conc.erned with the analysis of the legal structure of 
capitalistic society, and their way of handling every problem is 
nothing other than historical rationalization based on a material-
istic interpretation of history. Therefore, their arguments are in 
the position of being unable to find any common academic basis 
with inte:1'pretative jurisprudence dealing with contemporary laws. 
Professor Yamanaka's arguments are subject to the same 
criticism; and those of Professor Kawashima are confined within 
the limits of a sociology of law not affiliated with Marxian juris-
prudence. 
So much has been said concerning the field of the study of 
private law. To the study of the law of procedure--the study of 
the law of civil procedure-the influence of Marxian jurisprudence 
has not yet ext*_nded. 
Paschukanis and his followers grasp the private substantive 
law only as a social norm (of capitalistic society), not touching 
upon its aspect as a judicial norm. This is a methodological defect, 
indeed a fatal one, of the contemporary study of private law, to 
3) Paschukanis, E., Allgeo~tei?te Rechtslehre ufLd Marxismus, ~hbers. 
von Dr. E. Hajos ( Werke des Marxismus-Le?~inismus, Bd. 22). 
4) Proble~~s of Th~.oretical .7urisprude7tce (the Collected Work,s of 
Yujiro K(~ho, Vol. I ~ . 
5) Yasuo Yamanaka. Civic Society aud the Gie,il Law ; Takenori 
Kawashima. The Theory of the Law of Prope~'ty. 
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regard the substantive law only in its aspecf, as a social norm, not 
extending to that as a judicial norm. For this very reason, even 
if scholars of private law accept the Marxian theory, sufficient 
harmony cannot be brought about between the two systems of 
theory, as in Professor Yamanaka's arguments ; nor can those 
scholars go beyond the field of sociology of law, which grasps the 
substantive lal'v only in its aspect as a social norm, as in Professor 
Kawashima's arguments6). 
6 ) In the preface to his work mentioned above, Paschukanis says, 
"In my thinl~ing, I have laid special emphasis upon the motive that 
shows the most perfcct reali･-ation of the form of law-the court of 
jt'_stice and its procedure." But in fact, in this book no systematic 
a~,"*alysis has be*"n attempted of the substantive law in its aspect as 
a judicial norm. In the field of the criminal law only has he given 
some criticism centering around "Nulla, poe?2.,a. si7~e lege". Probably, 
if we turn to the "exchangeable relation" of commodities for "the be-
ginning of the form of law" (i. e., the starting-point of analysis), 
the analysis of "procedure" on which state authority is imposed will 
be impossible. Professor Yamanaka stands in the same position as 
Paschukanis. Accordingly, as to the growth and structure of the 
substantive law as a social norm, he has successfully attempted a 
systematic and theoretical analysis, acceptin*~ the Marxian theory; 
but in its correlation with "procedure" (actions) his arguments are 
merely such as determine each aspect separately. For instance, in 
regard to the "socialization of the old Civil Code", he talks of the 
"law-creating function" (i. e., the law-creating power) of actions, 
but gives no systematic analysis of it. ( ~:,~:~ee his wol~k, Cil)ic Soci･ty 
aud the Ci~)il Law, p. 253.) 
But various categories in private law, such as l~ersonality 
(capacity to enjoy rights) , capacity fer legal action and things (as 
the object of rights) , the separation and opposition of rights i7~ rel7h 
and rights i7b personam, and therefore, of the contract relating to 
rights i~~ rel7~ and the contract relating to rights i?e persol~am, the 
establishment of various types of the contract relating to rights 
ilc pers07tam, etc.-all of these are historical categories which have 
grown into the present institutions, with "procedure" (actions) for 
a background. Therefore, it is impossible properly to analyze and 
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was the principle of civic society laid down in the eighteenth 
century, wh^ich asserted the predominance of civic soeiety over 
political society ; it is the theorv~ of a l~ight-~;cbtch state7). In 
modern states, actions, as I shall relate in detail later, are never 
confined to -the authoritative declaration of a social norm, but to 
this is added the state volition to embody a state intention8). For 
this very reason, the substantive law has a function as a judicial 
norm and, what is more, has an aspect in which that is predominant 
over its function as a social norm. 
In order to grasp theoretically the aspect of the substantive 
law as a judicial norm, it is necessary to analyze the state authority 
which forms the background of actions, and to do so we must ste'p 
into the field of the scie7bce of Sta,te. 
In this regard. what is the attitude of the Marxian study of 
public law? Marxian arguments on the state lay great emphasis 
on the theories of the structure of the state-theories of the class-
state-and as to the phonomenal side of the state's administration, 
they have a noticeable tone of political argumentation, strikingly 
lacking in legal consideration of present institutions. Especially, 
regardin*cr judicial po~;;ver, they deal chiefly with criminal actions, 
7) This points to the view of the state entertained by the liberal 
thinkers of i8th-century En*"land. It corresponds to the economic 
principle of laissez-faire of those times, that is, the economic theory 
that the individual's free pursuit of interests is led by an invisible 
hand (Adam Smith) and thus keeps a preestablished harrr~.0ny with 
the welfare of society as a whole, and it excludes to the utmost ex-
tent the interference of public rights in the individual's acts in 
economic society. Accordingly, within the state, it does not admit 
the function of the state as being anything more than the main-
tenance of order in the state (civil society). This is a figurative 
expression of this fact. 
8) My work, Monism a;ud Dualism in Cil)il Procedure ("Waseda Law 
Review", Vol. xxiv, Nos. 3-4, p. 272). 
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rarely treating of judicial power in general9). 
Then_ what has the study of the law of civil procedure been 
like so far? Indeed, it has been standing aloof from academic 
controversies on this matter. 
The study of the law of civil procedure severed itself from the 
study of private law in the days of Palbdehtee~ jurisprudence, but 
it could not affect the jurisprudential system, centering around the 
study of private law, traceable to Roman law. Researches by 
scholars of the law of procedure have mostly been confined to prob-
lems of legal technique centering about procedure, and have been 
entirely indif~erent to, and indeed, incompetent in, such a task as 
scientific analysis of the fundamental structure of the ~p rocedural 
systemlo). Once Franz Klein of Austria advocated a civil procedure 
9) Among the few writings on this subject. Stutsehka's Das Problem 
des Klassev~~eehts uled der Klasse7tjustiz, 1922", for example, is loose 
and rough fcr a legal ~;tudy. Marx could not wield his analyticai 
power so effectively in this quarter as in that of economic phenom-
ena. But saying, "Actions~ and law are not indifferent to each 
other", and again, "If the legislator is partial, no judge is impartial" 
he t,akes up the problem of the relation between the substantive law 
and actions. See Verhoudlungen des 6. 1~hei?eischen Lon2;dstags, 
Drittee Artikel, Debatten ~hber ctas Holzdiebstahlsgesetz, aus 
Rhei7bischel~ Zeitu~eg (Aus dem literarischen Nachlass von Kari 
Marx und Friedrich Engels 1841 bis 1850. Bd. 1. S. 3189). 
10) So long as the study of the law of procedure centers on argu-
ment on procedure, it is impossible to analyze the structure of the_ 
procedural system. In order to effect this, we must seek a clue in 
discussion of actions and start with the ana]ysis of state authority 
that forms the background of actions. However, so far as discussion 
of actions is concerned, the study of the law of procedure has not 
made a single step beyond the methodology of the Pon~dekte7b study 
of private law, contenting itself with syllogistic arguments on the 
structure of concepts. For this very reason, it has been possible 
for the study of the law of procedure to be independent of the 
Marxian theory. Again, for that very reason, as soon as the Nazi 
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based on social policies, but it was nothing more than a following 
of the paternalistic arguments on social policies of the latter part 
of the nineteeth century. 
As stated above, we have not yet found any academic basis 
common to both contemporary jurisprudence traceable to Roman 
law, and Marxian jurisprudence. In this connection, we may add 
here that in the field of economics as well, it is being disputed 
whether any theoretical 'correlation can be found between Marxian 
economics and modern theoretical economics centering on the theory 
of ~eneral equilibrium (that of the Lausanne school and the 
Austrian school ; and the Cambridge school, which does not neces-
sarily support the equilibrium theory) and whether any ~cademic-
ally common basis can be found between themll). Economics being 
still on such a level, it may be natural at the present stage that 
there should be a dislocation between Marxian jurisprudence, 
whose object of research is the superstructure of the economic 
basis, and contemporary jurisprudence. 
II. The Academic Correlation between Contemporary Jurispru-
dence and Marxian Jurisprudence 
As stated above, under existing conditions, there is between 
Marxian jurisprudence and contemporary jurisprudence-that is, 
"bourgeois jurisprudence"- a theoretical dislocation, and we have 
not found an acadernic basis common to both. 
Marxists will make light of it. Probably, simultaneously with 
theory of procedure was introdueed, it was accepted by many 
scholars without any reconsideration, and after the termination of 
the War it has been dissipated. 
11) See Moderu Theoreticc~l Ec07bomics cel~d Marxic~7~ ~c07bow~ics, edited 
by the Rironsha, especially the dispute between Professors Sugimoto 
and Yausi ; and Koichiro Suzuki's The Plc~n of the Thoory of Cc,pi-
talism ("Shiso", No. 2.94). 
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the class-state, Iaw (at least bourgeois law, that is, Iaw as the class-
law) will perish. Bourgeois jurisprudence, the object of whose re-
searches is the legal norm and the legal system that are to perish 
with the class-state, is a sheer nonentity when viewed from the 
standpoint of the Marxian theory. On the other hand, from the 
standpoint of contemporary jurisprudence traceable to Roman law, 
the Marxian structure-analysis of the legal system ceases to be a 
problem of jurisprudential theory at the very instant that it has, 
stepped beyond the limits of sociology of_ Iaw. After all, it may 
fcllow that they are eternally unrelated. 
But we do not think that way. The subject-matter of the inter-
pretative jurisprudence that forms the core of contemporary juris-
prudence is, so to speak, the function-analysis of the phenomenal 
forms of law. On the other hand, the Marxian theory has it~ 
academic center of gravity in the structure-analysis. In the in-
quiry into the rules of the development of the machinery of capi-
talistic economy, and the structure-analysis of the economic 
machinery itself and its superstructure (i. e, the social system, 
legal system, etc.), the Marxian theory is without a rival, and there 
bourgeois economics and jurisprudence fall far behind it. 
We cannot agree readily to the Marxian view of the world, 
and we have obje-"tions to raise to the theory that the state 
should perish with the downfall of capitalistic society. But we 
must fully recognize the academic value of the Marxian theory 
itself ; and especially its method of scientific structure-analysis 
must be introduced ,into the realm of jurisprudence. Thus, in a 
mutually auxiliary relations with the function-analysis of the forms 
of the legal phenomena of contemporary jurisprudence, it will be 
possible to enrich legal theories, and, breaking down the self-sufii-
cient system of jurisprudence, to bring about its correlation with 
the neighboring sciences. 
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Such an academic attitude, when viewed from the standpoint 
of Marxism, will be a separation of ideologies and academic 
methods, and may be nothing more than a bourgeois idealisml2). 
But no ideology exists in academic methods themselves. My feeling 
is that ideologies exist in those who employ the acedernic methods. 
III. The Starting-Point for the Analysis of th*_ Structure of the 
Legal System 
Here, the object of my consideration will be exclusive_ly the 
system of private law. Paschukanis sought the beginning of the 
structure-analysis of the system of private law in the analysis of 
the fcrms of commodities, following Marxi's methodology. The 
consequence was that the functions of state authority in the social 
life governed by private law were ne"*lectedl3), and the substan-
tive law was. viewed only in its aspect as a social norm. This is 
the case with Professors Yamanaka's and Kawashima's arguments, 
as I mentioned before, and Rasumouski asserts that the study of 
legal forms should be founded upon the analysis of the concept 
of the legal subjectl4) . But ~s Paschukanis points out, it is not neces-
12) Marxian jurisprudence is almost entirely impotent as an inter-
pretation of legal norms. The weak point of Marxian academic 
methods lies in their function-analysis of phenomenal forms, and it 
is for this reason that in explaining the general machinery of ex-
change economy, Marxian economists do nothing but develop a cer-
tain simple theory of equilibrium, such as the equivalent exchange 
of abstract labor-values. In this respect, their theory falls far 
behind the elaborate theory of equilibrium of modern theoretical 
economics. Similarly in the field of jurisprudence, we must turn 
to contemporary jurisprudence for interpretations of legal norms. 
Such an attitude as that of excluding bourgeois jursiprudence as 
meaningless will end in reducing one's own academic range. 
13) This point is also indicated by the late Professor Kako (see his 
work nlentioned above, p. 122) . 
14) Rasumouski, I. P., Proble~n der Inarxistische?~ Rechtslehre, S. 18. 
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sarily a propef starting-point for the analysis of legal phenomenal5) . 
All norms call for voluntary observance on the part of their 
followers. When they are not voluntarily observed, it is legal norms 
that can be enforced by a systernatic authority. The law of civic 
society is a social norm that prevails in civic society, but civic 
society itself has no systematic authority to enforce the observance 
of the norm. The systematic enforcement of a norm necessi-
tates the action of authoritative political society (i. e., the state). 
Thus la*,v begins simultaneously with the state. And the fcrrn 
in which the legal norm is enforced by the state is "actions". 
The substantive law is said to be a judicial r.orm as well as a 
social norm. This is because t~ne substaritive la-vv is the law of civic 
soc{_et,y and at the same time actions are carried out upon the 
foundation of the substantive law. 
As the effectiveness of the legal norm is thus secured by 
actions, the analysis of the legal system must begin with the 
analysis of the "action". The analysis of actions is supposed, ol~_ 
the one hand, to be retraced to the analysis of state power (i. e.. 
authority), and on the other, to extend to the analysis of the sub-
stantive law upon which actions depend-the analysis of their duai 
structure as a social norrn and a judicial norrn alike. The analysis 
of the legal system ought to have its beginning in the core of the 
legal system, and Paschuk-anis, who has sought this beginning in 
the economic basis that fcrms the substructure of the legal system, 
has made an inadequate startl6). 
IV. Actions and State Authority 
For a man to judge a man, authority (i. e., power) must afford 
~ background. A man judges a man-this is an action. Perhaps 
15) Paschukanis, op. cit., pp. 8r et seq. 
16~ In this regard, I shall express my view ftllly on another occasion. 
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it must have existed since the very beginning of the growth of 
human society in order to maintain the order of the collective life 
of human societyl7). But it was after the appearance of political 
society in the form of the state that actions carried out by means 
of law-actions having a fixed aim and carried out through a 
systematic machinery of power-came into existence. According 
to Eegels, the state "grew out of the necessity to suppress class-
opposition", and therefore, "it is the state of the strongest class 
governing economically"I8). It may be disputable whether all 
states are class-states, but it is indisputable that every state has 
a governing power over its territory. And because it has a govern-
ing power, the state is transcendental, and the modern state reigns 
over civic society with t,his transcendental authority. Actions 
carried out in the name of the state are nothing other than the, 
embodiment of the state's authority. 
The background of actions is the state's authority. In order 
to achieve the object in view. "authority" expresses itself as 
"power". Sociology, grasping it in terms of its mental interaction 
in society, calls it the state's "volitional power". Jurisprudence, 
accepting this viewpoint, asserts that "actions are the declaration 
of state volition". And the science of State, taking its stand on 
the sharp drscnmmatron between state and socrety, calls state 
power "sovereignty", expressing it in terms of a legally abstract 
concept. The action is "the operation of judicial power", one of the 
three divisions of sovereignty. 
Actions are the declaration of state volition. Jurists do not 
17) See From God's Justice to Man's Justice (in my The Study Of the 
Substcv~~til)e Law and the Study of the Lcbw of ProceduTe, pp. 267 
et seq.). 
18) Engels : The Origilt of the Family, Private Property alrd the 
State, translated by E. LTntermann. Chicago, 190_9, p. 208. 
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doubt this definition of actions, but as regards their logicai struc-
ture, they accept formal logic (i. e., intellectual logic) and say that 
actions are the conclusion of the handling of legal logic by means 
of the syllogism (i. e., deductive reasoning), regarding laws as the 
major premise and ascertained facts as the minor. This means 
that they entirely disregard the element of volition in actions. 
We must analyze state volition in actions. The analysis of state 
volition makes possible the analysis of the state authority form-
ing the background of actions and the prescription of the nature 
of that authority. 
State volition in actions is embodied in a dual process, that is, 
in separate and concrete contents on the on~ hand and in general 
and abstract contents on the other. I shall provisionally call the 
former "judicial volition" and the latter "legislative volition." 
1 ) Judicial volition (i, e., separate and concerete volition of 
the state) 
By means of actions (civil decisions) the disputes of a con-
crete case are settled. The action is the expression of state volition 
to attempt the settlement of disputes. State volition to settle dis-
putes by actlons is a concrete volition in a separate case, but 
insofar as the content of the action settling those disputes is re-
stricted by the substantive law, it is of negative character. 
2) Legislative volition (i. e., general and abstract volition) 
The state can control its territory and civic society according 
to its intention. In this case, the substantive statute law (i. e., 
law enacted by the state) functions as the expression of the general 
and abstract volition of the state regarding such control. And as 
ac_tions are carried out upon the fcundation of the substantive law, 
the genetal and abstract volition of the state implied by the sub-
stantive statute law is individualized and made concrete by the 
action. 
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V. The Functional Interrelation between "Judicial Volition" and 
"Legislative Volition" 
As stated above, in an action, state volition attempting to settle 
the disputes of a particular case (judicial volition) functions 
directly, but through the substantive law which is applied, gen-
eral and abstract state volition (Iegislative volition) functions be-
hind it. The question is the ftmctional interrelation between these 
two forms of state volition. 
According to the idea of the night-watch state peculiar to the 
eighteenth century, it was proper for the state not to interfere 
actively in the private life (the economic life) of civic society. 
And it can be said that such was, at the same time, the idea of the 
private-law system on the whole. The action under such a private-
law system makes it its entire task to enforce and realize a social 
norm prevalent in civic society from necessity and according to 
the will of the p;arties, ar^d the substantive law can be a judicial 
norm so far as it is efficient 'as a social norm. In other words, the 
substantive law ftmctions primarily as a social norm, and it is 
secondarily that it fL･,nctions as a judicial norm. Accordingly, such 
an action is a declaratory action which confirms the exis+.ence of 
a socia~1 norm, and its efficacy is exclusively in its power to confirm 
la*v (.-* concrete norm). 
So far as the idea of the private-lav,' system stated above pre-
vails by itself, only the lj:egative state volition attempting to settle 
disp utes (judicial volition) is expressed in actions, and the state 
volition attempting to control actively the private life within the 
territory (Iegislative volition) fails to function at all. But even 
at the beginning of modern states, such an enlightened and liberal-
istic idea was not realized in the field of civil actions. Especially 
in the nineteenth century, the infiltration of state power into the 
national private life could not but accelerate gradually. For this, 
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there are intricacies of causes such as the rise of the fourth estate, 
the necessity of adjusting the national structure after the tem-
porary settlement of-the scramble for overseas colonies, etc., but I 
shall leave them out of consideration for the time being. 
The infiltration of state power into the national private life, 
in the field of the le*"al sv. stem, was carried out through two routes. 
One was the accelerative increase of legislation represented by the 
codification movement (culminating in a flood of control-1egisla-
tion in the war years) in various countries since the nineteenth 
century, and the other was the enlargement and strengthening of 
judicial poiver. 
The interference of the state in the nation~"I private-law system 
(the embodiment of legislative volition) was effected by legisla-
tion in the form of special civil laws. The separate laws (private-Iaw 
statutes) in the early and intermediate years of the German com-
mon law are mostly of such a nature. But the solidification of the 
itlachinery of modern states and the consequent craving for the cen-
tralization of power, going hand in hand wit~h the enlargement. and 
strengthening of judicial power, progressed into a tendency toward 
compiling codes as general private laws. The French Civil Code 
of 1804 and the Austrian Civil Code of 1811 are typical civil 
legislation. In Germany, the national state of things in those days 
had r}ot yet reached such a stage as to make possible the compila-
tion of a unified code, but it needs no special mention that violent 
contr*DVersies on code compilation arosel9). 
A civil code, as a general law, is expected to imply all the 
legal norrns in its range. Therefore, in it there are some parts in 
which a social norm that is actually in effect in civic society (i. e., 
the customary law) has been made into a provision as it is, and 
19) As to the details see The Sc~~)ign~/-Thibaut C072troversy o?~ Code 
Co~lupilcvtiof~ ("Waseda Law Review," Extra Issue, No. 1). 
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aceordingly, in these parts a written code is merely the authorita-
tive declaration (effective in confirming law) of the established 
customary law (i. e., a social norm). Hence, in this case, the legis-
lative volition mentioned above has not gone so far as to have a 
positive sense (i. e., effectiveness in creating law). But, of course, 
the content of a code is not limited to this extent and the positive 
legislative volition of the state is concretely expressed in the fol-
lowing points. And for this very reason, modern states have been 
eager to compile codes. 
1) Customs differ according to places, and it is impossible 
that the same customs should prevail in all parts of the state. 
In compiling a code, with the view of unifying them as much as 
possible, standard customs are made into provisions with general 
effect. And if they prove unsuitable, in specified matters either 
an effect like that of a legal norm is assigned to some customs in 
respective districts (e. g., the Law concerning the Application of 
Laws in General, the latter part of Article 2 ; the Civil Code, 
Articles 236, 263 and 294, etc.) or the binding force of customs 
is admitted according to the volition of the parties (the Civil 
Code, Article 92). 
2) The state, with the view of controlling to some extent 
transactions based on private law, Iays down a new written norm, 
and admits the exclusion of ~_ts application to some concrete cases 
according to the will of the parties (a facultative law) (the Civil 
Code. Article 91). 
3) The state lays down a written norm to restrict or adjust 
positively the content of a right or transaction in private law, and 
does not admit the exclusion of its application according to the 
will of 'the parties (an imperative law). Examples are the pro-
visions defining rights i7b rem, the provisions restricting the use 
by the owners of neighboring estates, the provisions limiting in-
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terest, etc. These are laid down often in the form of special 
laws . 
4) The state, with the view of adapting itself to new situa-
tions, social and economic, o~ ftlrthering them actively, sometimes 
lays down a legal-technical rule of construction or rule of action. 
Examples are the law of bills and various kinds of laws relating to 
the mortgaging of enterprises (e, g., the factory-hypothecation law, 
mining hypothecation law, railway-hypothecation law, etc.). 
In all these cases, active state volition (legislative volition) 
is more or less woven into statutes. So far as statutes are chiefly 
founded on the legislative volition of the state, and not on a social 
basis, their embodiment is guaranteed, after all, by "procedure" 
(actions), and they are thus made to have efficacy. And because 
of such efflciacy, the machinery of social economy is altered or a 
new machinery is given rise to within it, in order to adapt itself 
to that efficacy. So the statute in these cases primarily ftrnctions 
as a judicial norm and its function as a social norm is subordinated 
thereto both logically and genealogically. 
And when the substantive law ftlnctions primarily as a judicial 
norm, it brings about the enlargement of the discretionary range 
of the judge in actions and produce some aspects in which rights 
are established and obligations extinguished by actions-(a con-
crete norm-creating power of actions)20). After all, the enlarge-
ment and strengthening of judicial power follows, and it is merely 
one of its subsidiary aspects that confirmative judgment and then 
20) So far as actions function primarily as a social norm, they have 
only law-confirming power. It is when the substantive law primarily 
function as a judicial norm that actions have concrete norm-creat-
ing power. As regards the law-confirming and law-creating po-wers 
of actions, see my work, Actio,~, Claim a72d th,e Effect of Excludil~g 
Further LitigatiolL (Res Judicata) , pp. 301 et seq. 
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constitutive judgment came to the fore as new types21). 
VI. The Analysis of "State Volition (Authority) ,' 
Actions depend upon the substantive law. And as the sub-
stantive law is effecitve in civic society as a social norm, in order 
to grasp the actual condition in which the substantive law ftmc-
tions in actions as a social norm, we must first consider the actual 
condition of civic society in which the substantive law is in effect as 
a social norm. To this end, it is necessary to go so far as to analyze 
the structure of the economic society (i. e., capitalistic society) 
that forms the basis of civic society, and in it the Marxian study 
of private law is without a rival. And then to grasp its phenom-
enal aspects is the task of sociology of law. To these a 1_arge 
number of scholars have been devoting themselves. 
But this is not enough. The substantive law has a function 
as a judicial norm. As the action is the declaration of state volition 
that depends upon the substantive law-directly, state volition of 
the action itseif (the above-mentioned judicial volition) and re-
trospectively, state volition implied in the written substantive law 
~legislative volition)-we must admit that the content of actions 
is influenced by the nature and content of the state authority that 
forms the source of these state volitions. Therefore, it is neces-
sary that the analysis of actions and that of the structure of pro-
cedure should be traced to the analysis of state authority. 
According to Engels, the state came into existence in order to 
prevent class-conflicts, but the state which thus appeared is the 
21) The growth of these new types is due to the fact that law-creating 
power was allowed to actions by the enlargement and strengthening 
of judicial power. Regarding confirmative judgment, see the above 
work, pp. 85 et seq., and as regards law-creating judgment, pp. 98 
et seq. 
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state of "the class that governs economically" (as above). This 
assertion of Engels' is a most direct expression of his view of the 
class-state and it is the starting-point as well as the goal of the 
Marxian science of State. We doubt whether we can grasp the 
intrinsic nature of the state by only defining it to be the class-
state22). But we cannot deny that it has a coloring suggestive of 
class. The modern state has a transcendental existence over civic 
society, but we cannot think that it is in a purely neutral position 
'impartial among classes. Nor has there been a purely neutral state 
in the past. The class distinction of the state will necessarily in-
fluence its "actions". 
Marxists define capitalistic society of today as the hegemony 
of monopolistic bourgeoisie. But the political n]*achinery forming 
its superstructure is so complicated that it cannot be explained by 
such a simple formula. On one hand there is some remnant of 
feudalistic infiuences (thou*~h the situation is slightlv~ different in 
America and other new states), and on the other there is the rise 
of the fourth estate. The progress of development is not the same 
in all states and ages. Bonapartistic monarchism of modern ages, 
Prussian-type monarchism, our absolute Emperor system before 
the termination of the war, etc.-all of these sho~'^,' f,hat modern 
states are fcunded more or less on the balance of feudalistic in-
fluences (the center of which in Japan was the Emperor), bourgeoi-
22) From his standpoint of pra*~matisnll, Mr. R. M. Cohen proved the 
necessi+*y of recognizing the relation of mutual dependence between 
opposed principles, as an academic attitude in social sciences. He 
himself calls it "the principle of polarity," and he also says that if 
either one of two olp posed principles is denied, the meaning of the 
other will naturally be diminished (see Cohen, M. R., Reaso~~ at~d 
Natu~'e, London, 1931, p. 426). Though the science of State does 
not belong to my special study, I wonder if we can grasp the intrinsic 
nature of the state only from the viewpoint of the class-state. 
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sie and proletariat. And state authority is characterized by the ebb 
and flow of these forces, and that with differences. It is a matter 
of course that "procedure" and "ac*rons" cannot remail~ unin-
fiuenced by this. 
Let us cite a familiar instance. It stands clear in our memory 
that in 1948 the legality of production-eontrol in labor-disputes 
(that is, the control and management of factories according to 
the employees' unilateral volition) was actively mooted in the law-
courts, and the decisions (of the lower courts) were varied. The 
Emperor's courts of justice under the Meiji Constitution would 
readily have pronoLmced it illegal. The recurrence of production-
control in various places was nothing other than a peculiar phenom-
enon which took place in the transition-period in the change of 
our economic basis after the war. But the fact that there appeared, 
though in the lower courts, decisions purporting to recognize 
the legality of production-contr0123) cannot be fully explained 
merely in terms of the change of the economic basis, and the conse-
sequent development of social jurisprudence. It is necessary for 
us to take into consideration the fact that the state authority 
forming the background of actions, undergoing a qualitative change 
after the war, has become different from what it was before the 
war, though the judges who compose the courts of justice may 
themselves be unaware of it. To do this, we must go so far as 
to analyze our political machinery after the termination of the 
23) These were decisions on criminal cases deriving ftom production-
control (such as violence, business-obstruction, theft and seizure of 
~pparatus, etc.). One instance is the verdict of "not guilty" in the 
first trial of the production-control at the Yamada Steel-Works 
Company (November 22, 1947, the Third Criminal Section of the 
Osaka District Court) . There are in addition some decisions 
legalizing production-control on certain conditions. 
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war24) . 
Furthermore, the actual condition before the war *,vas more 
complicated. For over seventy years from the Meiji Restoration 
(1867) to the outbreak of the Pacific War, through the three 
eras of Meiji. Taisho and Showa, our politics, economy and social 
circumstances went through rapid changes. To analyze their 
development closely and grasp the substance of the procedural 
system in the Emperor's coLirts of justice is an untried task left 
for the future. Here it must sufiice to indicate where the chief 
problems lie. 
1) As might have been expected from the nature of the Meiji 
Government. Such state intentions as the L0stering of the 
bourgeoisie, the toleration of the existence of feudal landlords, etc., 
for which that Government had exerted itself since the beginning 
of that era, were visible in such court-decisions as protected com-
mercial capital and ustiry interest and tolerated high rates of 
land-rents, etc. And to hasten the capital-concentration after the 
Sino-Japanese War, and to protect monopolistic capital ~fter the 
Russo-Japanese War, there accumulated a large number of decisions 
favorable to enterprisers. Further, the fact that there was not 
a single case in which civilians won a suit concerning an Imperial 
estate, evidences the real state of the Emperor system25). There 
are many ~uch problems, besidcs. 
2) Our Emperor absolutism, though it was derived from the 
Prussian law of civil procedure and enacted the liberalistic law of 
civil procedure (1890), produced bureaucratic procedure. It may 
be proper to regard the friction between such bureaucratic proce-
24) See my treatise, "Prodibctio~t-Control ce~rd Public Welfce're-Ce7~-
teri7eg about Ju~icial Theories" ("Labor and Labor Law", Ist issue). 
25) See Shintaro Toda: The Altalysis of the Eco'zomic Ba8is of th~ 
Emperor System, pp. 88 et seq. 
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dure and the liberalistic law of civil procedure, which took place in 
the process, as the chief cause of the ineradicable delay in proce-
dure under the old law of civil procedure. Furthermore, the judi-
cial machinery under the Emperor sy~tem, as stated above, was 
highly conducive to the tendency to reflect state volition upon_ 
court-decisions. Such a tendency is likely either to neglect o~ to 
misrepresent the regulations of the substantive law, with the conse-
quence that the substantive law (i. e., statute) functions as a judi-
cial norm rather than as a social norm. In observing, these cir-
cumstances, to analyze precedents from the standpoint of ~0ciolo*"y 
of law is, so to speak, to look o'nly on one side of the shield. It is 
llecessary for us to analyze. the judicial ma"-hinery under the Em-
peror system, which forms the background of actions. 
3) Owing to its rapid development, our capitalistic machinery 
has noticeable disproportions and contradictions within it. Besides, 
because it has developed in dependence upon bureaucracy, its in-
fluence on political machinery is comparatively slight. It seems 
that these peculiaritics prevented the appearance in this country 
of professional courts of justice such as industrial courts, com-
mercial courts, etc., with businessmen of various walks of life 
participating in them, in spite of the extraordinary development 
of our industry. 
VII. Conclusion 
This treatise has been intended to c.Iarify the correlation be-
tween the Marxian theory on the one hand and the theory of pro-
cedure'in what it calls "bourgeois jurisprudence" on the other. But 
I believe that the study of the law of procedure is not isolated in 
the system of jurisprudence, but constitutes the whole system of 
jurisprudence in its reciprocal relation with the study of the sub-
stantive law. As this belief is my academic standpoint26), I cannot 
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confine my discussion to the field of the study of the law of 
procedure. 
I have fcr many years been advocating the introduction of 
the theories of the substantive law into the field of the study of 
the law of procedure. This reciprocally necessitates that the study 
of the substantive law should discard its former academic attitude 
of indifrerence to the theories of the law of procedure. And the 
synthesis of the theories of the substantive law and those of the 
law of procedure is possible only in a higher academic stage 
("dimension", to use a mathematical expression) where the study 
of ~he substantive law and the study of the law of procedure are 
united, and such is the theory of actions. This is the system of 
jurisprudence which I form in my mind. 
This (~:onception will necessarily tend to turn to "actions" for 
the starting-point of the analysis of the legal system attempted 
from the standpoint of social sciences. It is from such an .",cademic 
standpoint that special empha**is has been laid in this treatise or_ 
judicial theories. Therefore, thou*'h the analysis of the procedural 
system from the standpoint of social scienc,es is a problem fcr the 
study of the law of procedure proper. I have been unable, in this 
treatise, to give anything more than a rough sketch of it. On thls 
subject I shail proceed ftlrther with my researches on the hasis 
of the theory of this treatise. 
26) See my work, The Study of the Substc~?~tive Lc~w a7~d the Study 
of the Lcew of ProcediLre, pp. 18 et seq. 
